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"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls of government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over man, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself."'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1971, the U.S. Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act2
(FECA) in an effort to halt the spiraling costs of federal election
campaigns.' FECA was the first comprehensive effort to address campaign
spending in federal elections.4 In an attempt to improve FECA, Congress
amended the Act on four different occasions. 5 The latest amendment,
known as the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, was enacted in
2002.6 Despite Congress's efforts to reduce spending, campaign spending
has increased dramatically since 197 1.After 36 years, campaign finance
reform remains one of the hottest topics in American politics. This Article
provides a plausible explanation for FECA's failure to reduce campaign
spending.
FECA has failed to achieve its purpose because political candidates,
incumbents and challengers, are inherently motivated to circumvent
FECA's spending limitations. The relationship between political
candidates and FECA is similar to the relationship between oil producers
and oil cartels, because oil cartels, like FECA, attempted to regulate cost
by imposing limitations on their members.8 Understanding the dynamics
that led to the demise of oil cartels could explain why FECA has failed to
reduce campaign spending and why it was amended four times. By making
the comparison, this Article classifies incumbent candidates that voted for

1. THE FEDERAUIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
3. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1821-22.
4. See id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 7-47.
6. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 9-47.
8. See generally MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTONARY, http:/www.m-w.comldictionary/cartel
[hereinafter Cartel Definition] (last visited May 20, 2008) (defining a cartel as "a combination of
independent commercial or industrial enterprises designed to limit competition or fix prices" or "a
combination of political groups for common action").
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FECA as members of the "FECA cartel." Members of Congress that did
not vote for FECA (did not support FECA) and the challengers are
classified as non-members. Oil producers (cartel members and nonmembers) are motivated to "cheat" or circumvent the cartel's supply
quotas to maximize their individual profits. Similarly, incumbents and
challengers are motivated to "cheat" or circumvent FECA's spending
limitations in an effort to maximize their individual payoffs. The aggregate
effect of "cheating" by individual political candidates has made it
impossible to reduce campaign spending in the same way that supplying
oil above the cartel's supply limitation makes it impossible to reduce the
market supply of oil.
This Article begins with a brief history of campaign finance reform
efforts in the United States. Then, it compares the dynamics between
political candidates and FECA to oil cartels and oil producers. The second
part of this Article proceeds in two steps. First, it describes FECA's
provisions to suggest that the Act tended to benefit incumbent candidates
more than challengers. Second, using public choice methodology, it argues
that FECA failed to reduce campaign spending because political
candidates were motivated to circumvent FECA's spending limitations in
the same way that oil producers are motivated to circumvent the cartel's
supply limitations.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The history of federal election campaign reform dates back to 1870
when Congress enacted the Enforcement Act.9 The purpose of the Act was
to forbid fraudulent and corrupt practices during federal election
campaigns."0 Among other things, the Act prohibited "false registration,
bribery, illegal voting, making false returns of votes cast, interference in
any manner with officers of election, and the neglect by any such officer
of any duty required of him by state or federal law."' 1 The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act 2 with a few exceptions.13
9. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1840
(describing the Enforcement Act of 1870).
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See Ex ParteSiebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1879) (holding that Congress has the power to
enact legislation to regulate elections and to punish election officials for any unlawful acts).
13. See State v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 227 (1875) (holding that the power of Congress to
regulate State election procedures can be exercised only when the procedures operate to exclude
the votes of qualified voters because of race or color).
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In 1907, Congress enacted the Tillman Act. 4 The purpose of the
Tillman Act was to prohibit "national banks and corporations from making
contributions in connection with federal elections."' 5 The Act instituted a
series of reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to interstate
political committees and persons making political contributions. 6
However, the Act applied only to general elections. 7 In 1910, Congress
amended the Tillman Act with the enactment of the Corrupt Practices
Act, 8 which extended the Tillman Act to primary elections and general
elections.' 9 Congress was motivated by the fact that, in the South, most
elections ended with primary elections because only a few candidates ran
as Republicans. Thus, to make the Tillman Act applicable to the Southern
States, Congress extended the Act to primary elections.2"
In 1939, Congress enacted the Hatch Political Activities Act2 (HPAA)
in order to prevent "pernicious political activities., 22 The HPAA
discouraged federal employees from campaigning for political candidates
and from interfering with federal elections. It also made it unlawful for
federal employees to offer work, compensation or other consideration to
any person for any political activity.23 The HPAA applied to military
personnel and civil service employees, 24 and it limited political
contributions to $5,000 for individual contributions and $3 million for
political committees.
In 1943, Congress enacted the Labor Disputes Act, commonly referred
to as the Smith-Connally Act, 26 which gave the President the power to
appropriate industrial plants. The Act also prohibited labor unions from
making campaign contributions to candidates in federal elections.27 In
1947, the Labor Management Relations Act made the provisions of the
Corrupt Practices Act and the Tillman Act applicable to "campaign
14. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1841
(describing the Tillman Act of 1907).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. (describing the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925).
19. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1841.
20. See id.
21. See id. (describing the Hatch Political Activities Act).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. S. REP.No.92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1841.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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expenditures, primary elections, and political conventions or caucuses held
to select candidates for elective federal office." '
In an effort to update and aggregate the regulations promulgated since
the enactment of the Tillman Act, Congress passed FECA in 1971.29
FECA's purpose was to halt the increasing cost of campaigning for federal
office.3" FECA comprised four titles.3' Title I contained a series of
limitations on campaign expenditures for broadcast and non-broadcast
advertising.3 2 Title II criminalized certain campaigning activities." Title
II contained extensive disclosure procedures for campaign expenditures
and contributions.34 Finally, title IV offered a few tax incentives to the
public in the form of tax credits or tax deductions for campaign
contributions to candidates for federal office.35 This Article will focus on
title I.
FECA was amended on four different occasions. The first amendment
was enacted in 1974.36 This amendment added legal limits on campaign
contributions and expenditures.37 Also, it provided public financing for
federal primary elections and improved FECA's reporting requirements.38
However, the Supreme Court, found certain provisons of the 1974
Amendment unconstitutional. 39 As a result, Congress enacted a new
amendment in 1976,40 which created additional spending and reporting
regulations and established the Federal Election Commission.4 It also
eliminated the limit on the amount of political contributions to
candidates.42 Congress passed another amendment in 1979 to improve
FECA's spending limitations. The 1979 amendment limited the use of
28. See id.
29. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. §§ 101-06.
33. See id. §§ 201-06.
34. 1971 FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 309-11, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
35. See id. § 401.
36. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1976) (holding some of FECA's limitations on
campaign expenditures unconstitutional because political contributions could be considered a form
of political speech).
40. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,90 Stat. 475
(1976).
41. See id.
42. Id.
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''soft money," but allowed candidates to spend an unlimited amount of
"hard money" on specified campaign activities.43 To better regulate "soft
money" spending in federal elections, Congress passed a new FECA
amendment in 2002." This amendment is known as the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 or the McCain-Feingold Act.45
Despite the fact that the effort to provide for fair federal elections
began over a century ago, FECA has been inadaequate.46 To date,
numerous additional amendments to FECA have been introduced in
Congress.47 This apparent inability to provide for comprehensive campaign
finance reform raises important policy questions: Is it possible to halt
campaign spending? Why is Congress continuously willing to amend its
previous campaign finance regulations? Are political candidates motivated
to adhere to FECA's spending limitations? This Article attempts to address
these questions. It suggests that FECA's efforts to limit campaign
spending continue to fail because political candidates are motivated to
circumvent its spending limitations.
III. ANALYSIS
This section examines the original FECA.4" This Article posits that the
1971 FECA established various spending and price limitations that were
more advantageous to incumbents than to challengers.4 9 FECA's spending
limitations (aimed at reducing the overall cost of campaigning) tended to
benefit incumbents. Like FECA, oil cartels issue supply limitations in an
attempt to regulate cost. This Article explains that oil cartels often fail
because cartel members and other oil producers are motivated to
circumvent the cartel's supply limitations. By analogy, FECA has failed
to halt campaign spending because Members of Congress are challengers
(incumbents) motivated to "cheat" or circumvent FECA's spending
limitations. This Article concludes that the aggregate effect of "cheating"

43. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187,93 Stat. 1339
(1980).
44. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
45. Id.
46. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1840
(describing the Enforcement Act).
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-389, at 1 (2005).
48. See 1971 FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
49. See id.
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by individual political candidates makes it impossible to halt the spiraling
costs of federal election campaigns.5 °
The analysis section proceeds in two steps. First, it analyzes the
language and legislative history of the original FECA and argues that the
Act provided distinct benefits to incumbent candidates. Second, this
Article employs principles from public choice theory5' to demonstrate that,
with respect to FECA, Congress's behavior resembled that of an oil
cartel. 2 The comparison reveals why the 1971 FECA 5failed
to reduce
3
campaign spending and had to be periodically amended.
The second step has three parts. First, it introduces necessary and
foundational principles of a public choice theory analysis. Second, it
describes the formation and dissolution of oil cartels. Third, using public
choice theory methodology, it analogizes the relationship between FECA
and political candidates to the relationship between oil producers (cartel
members and non-members) and an oil cartel, suggesting a plausible
explanation for FECA's failure to reduce campaign spending.
A. FECA 's Spending andPricingScheme Tends to Benefit
Incumbent Candidates
The following section reviews the legislative history of the 1971
FECA54 to demonstrate that the original FECA provided distinct
campaigning benefits to incumbent candidates. It begins with a brief
description of the Act's titles. Then, it argues that the Act's spending and
pricing scheme tended to advantage incumbents. The main focus of this
section is title I of the 1971 Act.
1. The Structure of FECA
The 1971 FECA was the first comprehensive effort to regulate federal
campaign financing.55 The Act was designed to apply to presidential, vicepresidential and congressional elections. 6 Its purpose was twofold. First,
the Act "attempte[d] to halt the spiraling cost of campaigning for public
50. See id.; 1974FECA, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263 (1974); 1976 FECA, Pub. L. No.
94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976). 1979 FECA, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980); Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
51. See, e.g., JaneS.ShawPublicChoice Theory, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Public
ChoiceTheory.htmn (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
52. See generally Cartel Definition, supra note 8.
53. See 1976 FECA, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 102, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
54. See 1971 FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
55. See id.
56. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1822.
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office."57 Second, it attempted to give "candidates for public office greater
access to media so that they may better explain their stand on issues."58
To these ends, the Act was divided into four titles. Title I dealt with
59
"limitations on campaign spending and political advertisement charges."
Title H1 criminalized and de-criminalized certain campaign activities.6"
Title LI established a series of rules governing the disclosure of federal
campaign funds and contributions.6 ' Title IV provided a few tax incentives
to individuals making political contributions to candidates for federal
office.62 A more detailed analysis of each title follows.
The purpose of title I was to reduce campaign spending while
increasing the candidates' access to available media to better communicate
their views. 63 Title I established four general devices to accomplish these
goals.' First, it repealed the "equal opportunity" requirement of section
315 of the Federal Communications Act to encourage broadcasters to
provide more free advertising to federal candidates.65
Second, it required that the broadcast media and the non-broadcast
media charge candidates their "lowest unit rate. 6 6 Third, it required that
broadcasters make their lowest unit rate available to political candidates
for a specified period of time prior to a primary or general election.67
Fourth, the Act imposed an overall limitation on expenditures for
broadcast and non-broadcast advertising.68
The Act eliminated the "equal opportunity" requirement of section 315
of the Federal Communications Act. 69 Under section 315, broadcasters
offering free time to candidates of their choosing were obligated to offer
the same amount of free time to opposing candidates.70 The Senate
Commerce Committee and the Senate Rules and Administration
Committee considered eliminating section 315 of the Communications
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1852.
60. Id. at 1858.
61. S. REP. No.92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1823.
62. See id.
63. See id.at 1821-22.
64. See 1971 FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (containing the bulk of these
provisions in title I, §§ 10 1-06).
65. S. REP. No.92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1852-54.
66. Id. at 1853.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 1856-57.
69. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (2002) (codifying § 315 of the Communication Act of 1934).
70. See id.
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Act.7 Both committees relied on testimony and reports from various
representatives of the communications media, which concluded that
eliminating the equal opportunity requirement would enable broadcasters
to offer more free advertising time to major political candidates of the
major political parties.72
Based on such testimony, both committees decided that eliminating the
equal opportunity requirement would increase the amount of free media
advertising for major political candidates.73 For example, the report of the
Rules and Administration Committee stated that "[i]n most elections there
are only two or three serious candidates. The views of those serious
candidates are seldom heard on free radio or television because a number
of fringe candidates or potential candidates are waiting ... to demand
precisely the same amount of time given to serious candidates."74 The
Commerce Committee noted that the prior elimination of the equal
opportunity requirement in presidential elections "resulted in a more
widely informed electorate" in the 1960s." 5 The Committee intended to
duplicate this result in congressional elections.76
Furthermore, title I required "the communications media to charge
political candidates at the 'lowest unit rate' for a specified period of time
prior to an election.77 "At all other times charges to legally qualified
candidates could not exceed those made for comparable use of the
station's facilities" by other advertisers.7 8 A similar limitation was
imposed on advertising charges in the non-broadcast media.79 The
Commerce Committee and the Rules and Administration Committee
considered arguments in support of these limitations.8" Each committee
reasoned that, while there are many factors contributing to the increasing
costs of campaigning, campaign expenditures on broadcast media were a
major cause of high campaign spending.8 ' Additionally, the committees
71. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1853-54; S.
REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1775-76.
72. See S. REP. No.92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1774; S. REP.NO.
92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1853-54.
73. See supra text accompanying note 71.
74. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1854.
75. S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1775.
76. See id.
77. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1855.
78. Id. at 1828.
79. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1791.
80. See, e.g., id.at 1974; S.REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1821, 1853-54.
81. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1853-54.
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concluded that broadcasters charged political candidates higher rates than
other advertisers.82 Also, Congress imposed a normative duty on private
broadcast companies, which meant that the broadcast media owed a duty
to inform the public of the candidates' political views.8 3
In drafting the above provisions, both committees relied heavily on
allegations that the media charged candidates unfair prices for political
advertising. 4 However, neither committee considered any hard data to
support the limitation other than a series of conclusory statements of a few
media representatives. 5 The report of the Committee on Rules and
Administration stated, "[w]hile we do not have any definitive facts as to
the differences between 'lowest unit rate' and the amount being charged
political candidates, we are hopeful that an overall reduction in campaign
costs will occur as a result of this legislation. 8 6
Also, title I made the lowest unit rate available to a candidate for only
forty-five days prior to a primary election and sixty days prior to a general
election. 7 A similar limitation was created for advertising in the nonbroadcast media.88 The committees reasoned that longer campaigns
resulted in higher campaign costs. They hoped to encourage spending
within the forty-five-day or the sixty-day period by giving candidates a
favorable advertising rate.89
Title I also limited the total amount of money a candidate could spend
on broadcast or non-broadcast media.9" The Act "[set] a limitation for
broadcast media of five cents multiplied by the estimate of resident
population of voting age for the particular Federal office sought, and a
separate but identical limitation for non[-]broadcast media."'" The same
section permitted "a candidate to spend for broadcast media any
unexpended balance of the amount he would be permitted to spend for
non[-]broadcast media" and vice versa.92
Title RI legalized "bona fide loans to political candidates" and
broadened "the definition of political contribution and political

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
See S. REP. NO. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1774-75.
See id. at 1777-79.
S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1855.
S. REP. No.92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1791-92.
Id.at 1779-85.
Id.
Id.
S.REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1825.
Id.
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expenditure."93 Also, it "[e]liminated unregulated political committees...
[r]epealed the limitation on the amount ofindividual political contributions
...;[e]liminated the maximum limitation on the amount of money any
one political committee can handle; and... [p]rohibited unsecured debts
by political candidates for certain regulated industries. 94
The Rules and Administration Committee determined that bona fide
bank loans should be permitted to enable candidates who are not
individually wealthy to run for office.95 Under the same title, a bank is
prohibited from making unsecured loans to candidates.96 Also, the same
committee decided to eliminate the $5,000 limitation on individual
contributions because the limitation was probably unconstitutional and
97
because "[f]ull disclosure [made] such limitation unnecessary.
Moreover, the $3 million limitation on the amount a political committee
was entitled to handle was considered obsolete because the amount was
unrealistically low, and the reporting requirements of the Act reduced the
risk of abuse.98
Title III established a series of disclosure requirements. It specified: (1)
who should make periodic disclosures; (2) what the disclosure reports
should contain; and (3) when disclosure reports should be filed. 99 The
responsibility for administering the Act was given to the U.S. Comptroller
General and the General Accounting Office in lieu of the Clerk of the
House or the Secretary of the Senate."1 The Comptroller General and the
General Accounting Office reside within the legislative branch.'0 '
Title IV encouraged political contributions by allowing contributors to
claim a tax credit or, in the alternative, a tax deduction for making political
contributions. 1 2 The Act provided that "[a]n individual may claim as a
credit against the tax for the taxable year an amount equal to one-half of

93. Id. at 1858.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1858.
97. Id.at 1859. Some Members of the Committee argued that the limitation on individual
contributions probably violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because political
donations could be equated with political speech. Id. At the same time, FECA's full
disclosure
requirement increased the transparency of political contributions. Id. With this information, the
voters could decide who to vote for. Id. at 1860.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1859-63.
100. See id. at 1864.
101. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1864.
102. See id at 1838-39.
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the political
contributions made by the individual within the taxable
0 3
year."'

2. FECA Established a Pricing and Spending Scheme that Tends to
Benefit Incumbents
In considering whether FECA should be enacted, some Members of the
Commerce Committee and the Rules and Administration Committee
argued that FECA's title I provisions tended to benefit incumbent
candidates." They argued that the elimination of the equal opportunity
requirement of section 315 of the Communications Act, that the
establishment of the lowest unit rate requirement, that the implementation
of the total expenditure limitation, and that the requirement of adequate
security for bank loans tended to benefit incumbent candidates." 5
Specifically, FECA eliminated the equal opportunity requirement of
section 315 of the Communications Act.0 6 In the 1960s, section 315 had
been made inapplicable to federal presidential elections. 17 With the 1971
Act, Congress made section 315 inapplicable to congressional elections as
well.' Members of Congress considered testimony and reports from
various representatives of the broadcast media, expressing the view that
the elimination of the equal opportunity requirement would enable
broadcasters to offer more free advertising time to candidates of the major
political parties, which would better inform the public of the candidates'
political views.' 09
Some Members of Congress were concerned that the elimination of
section 315 would result in less free media advertising for candidates of
the minor political parties." 0 By eliminating section 315, FECA enabled

103. Id. at 1838. "The credit shall not exceed $20 for any taxable year." Id. If a person seeks
a tax deduction instead of a tax credit, "[t]he deduction shall not exceed $100 for any taxable year."
Id.
104. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773; S. REP. No. 92229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821.
105. See generallyS. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773; S. REP.
No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821.
106. Id. at 1827. Section 315 had placed an obligation on broadcasting stations to offer free
advertising time to all candidates running for the same office if free advertising time was offered
to at least one of those candidates. 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (2002) (codifying § 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934).
107. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1774.
108. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1824.
109. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1774.
110. Id. at 1774-75.
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broadcasters to offer free time to candidates of their choosing.' Also, the
testimony and reports of the media representatives clarified that
broadcasters would offer free advertising to candidates of the major
political parties. 12 At the same time, one could characterize minor party
candidates as challengers because minor political parties almost
exclusively had challengers run for elected office." 3
Minor parties rarely have elected representatives in the U.S. Congress.
While most minor party candidates can be characterized as challengers, it
does not follow that all challengers are minor party candidates.
Nevertheless, at least with respect to challengers who are minor party
candidates, the elimination of section 315 was to their detriment.
Furthermore, the elimination of the equal opportunity requirement
favored major party incumbents over major party challengers.' 14 Recall
that the elimination of the equal opportunity requirement was intended to
increase the amount of free advertising for major candidates of the major
political parties." 5 It is not clear what defines a major political candidate
of a major political party. While it is true that major candidates can be
challengers, incumbents of the major political parties are the major
candidates more often than not. The definition of a major political
candidate is a function of his likelihood to win, and that incumbents are far
more likely to win than challengers.1 6
For example, in the 2000 congressional elections, incumbents won the
vast majority of the races.17 It is not unreasonable to suggest that the
outcome of the 2000 elections represents what happens in congressional
elections. Furthermore, a candidate's likelihood to win an election seems
positively related to the amount of money the candidate spends on
campaigning."' In this respect, incumbents tend to be far better financed
11 9
and spend far more on their re-election campaign than their challengers.
It is more likely that there are more major political candidates who are
111. Id.
112. Seeid.
113. This argument is not expressly made in the Report, but it seems to be the rationale of the
larger argument that the elimination of section 315 tended to benefit incumbents. See id.
114. This argument also is not expressly made in the Report.
115. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1774-75.
116. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, Money Wins Big in 2000 Elections: Top Spenders Capture9 out
oflJO races,http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/Post-Election2000.htm (last visited June 5,
2008); CAMPAIGNSPENDING(Fall 2004), http://www.mit.edu/-17.251/finance.pdf(last visited June
5, 2008).
117. See generally supra note 116.
118. See generally supra note 116.
119. See generally supra note 116.
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incumbents than major political candidates who are challengers. It follows
that incumbents benefited more than challengers from the elimination of
the equal opportunity requirement because they were more likely to be
considered major political candidates.
There is another plausible reason that supports the above argument. It
arises from an examination of the media industry as a lobbying group.
Because lobbying groups seek special interest legislation, the elimination
of the equal opportunity requirement created an environment that made it
easier for the media industry to secure special interest legislation from
Congress. In the absence of the equal opportunity requirement,
broadcasters theoretically could offer free advertising time to incumbents
in exchange for favorable Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
appointments, favorable FCC regulations, favorable congressional
hearings and reports, and other favors and benefits. By eliminating the
equal opportunity requirement, Congress made free political advertising
scarcer, transforming it into a form of currency for the possible acquisition
of special interest legislation. While broadcasters could offer free
advertising to major challengers, incumbents probably received more free
advertising because, as Members of Congress, they had the power to
provide government goods and services.
Furthermore, challengers are far less likely to win congressional
races;,20 it does not make sense to procure special interest legislation from
a challenger who probably will not become a Member of Congress. For all
of the above reasons, major candidates of the major political parties tend
to be incumbents. Therefore, it is probably true that the incumbents
received more free advertising than the challengers because the
elimination of the equal opportunity requirement enabled broadcasters to
offer more free advertising to major political candidates.
Additionally, FECA' s lowest unit rate requirement tended to advantage
incumbents over challengers.121 The lowest unit rate requirement mandated
that the broadcast and the non-broadcast media charge no more than their
lowest unit rate for political advertisement for a specified duration of time
prior to an election (forty-five or sixty days depending on whether it was
a primary election or a general election).' 22 The lowest unit rate was the
rate that a broadcasting station would
charge its most favored commercial
23
advertisers for similar advertising. 1

120.
121.
122.
123.

See generallysupra note 116.
See S.REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1855.
See id. at 1828.
See id.
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A similar rule was used to calculate the lowest unit rate for the nonbroadcast media. 124 Congress argued that this price-fixing scheme was
justified because broadcasters charged political candidates in excess of
what they charged commercial advertisers for similar advertising. 125 Also,
section 101(b) of the 1971 Act offered the lowest unit rate to "legally
qualified candidate[s] ... 45 days before primary elections, 126 and 60 days
before general elections.' 27
Members of Congress acknowledged that incumbents could expend
less time and energy in campaigning than challengers.121 When incumbents
run for reelection, there is an inherent level of "accrued advertising" from
record in Congress. 129 New candidates do
previous campaigning and their
130
not have the same advantage.

Therefore, if a challenger and an incumbent are encouraged to advertise
within a limited time frame, assuming that both candidates spend the same
amount of money on advertising, then the incumbent will tend to derive a
greater benefit from advertising than the challenger. While some
challengers may be well known and well financed, incumbents tend to be
the better-known and better-financed candidates.' 3' Thus, an incumbent
who spends the same amount as a challenger within the forty-five-day
period or the sixty-day period presumably will have an advantage under
the Act. 132 Incumbents who spend more than133challengers during the same
period will have an even greater advantage.
The effect of the forty-five-day limitation is distinguishable from the
effect ofthe sixty-day limitation. Because the forty-five-day period applies
to congressional primaries, it affects candidates of the same party. The
forty-five-day limitation will tend to benefit the incumbents of a particular
party over the challengers of the same party in the manner described
124. See id. at 1830.
125. See id. at 1855.
126. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1827.
127. Id. at 1827.
128. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1805 (Views of
Messrs. Prouty, Griffin, Baker, Cook, and Stevens, noting that the bill "does not limit the overall
cost of campaigning. It merely limits the amount that candidates can spend on radio and television.
In doing so, it..., favors the incumbent officeholder[s] over the officeseeker and gives an unfair
advantage to the famous.").
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See generally supra note 116.
132. See generally supra note 116.
133. See generally supra note 116. If an incumbent derives a greater benefit from the same
amount of advertising than a challenger, then this benefit can be expected to be greater if the
incumbent spends more than the challenger on advertising.
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above. General elections are contests between members of different
parties. While it is true that some general elections can be contests
between two challengers from different parties, most general elections are
contests between incumbents and challengers who belong to different
parties. Therefore, even in general elections, FECA tended to favor
incumbents in the manner described above.
Also, FECA's limitation on total campaign expenditures tended to
benefit incumbent candidates.'34 FECA prescribed a formula to calculate
the total amount that any given candidate could spend on advertising in the
broadcast and the non-broadcast media.135 Regardless of how the formula
works, FECA prescribed a spending limitation that applied to all
candidates.' 36 Therefore, the dynamics between challengers and
incumbents examined in the previous paragraphs applies with equal force
to the limitation described. The limitation on total spending, as the
limitation on the time period in which the lowest unit rate was available,
tended to advantage incumbent candidates because they generally could
spend less on campaign advertisement than the challengers to achieve the
same impact on the electorate. 37
This discriminatory effect is aggravated when Congress is allowed to
set the total spending limitation too low. This is not to say that Congress
did so, but FECA's legislative history indicates that it might have set the
limitation too low. In crafting the spending limitation, Congress relied on
mere assumptions about necessary or appropriate spending
requirements.' 38 It had no real data showing actual candidate spending in
previous elections.139 Furthermore, Congress tied the total spending
limitation to the consumer price index without recognizing that many
factors can increase campaign spending in a manner that is
disproportionate to increases in the consumer price index. 4 °
One such factor is the development of new media outlets. For example,
the widespread use of television sets in the sixties and seventies

134. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1792.
135. See id. The formula is five cents multiplied by the eligible voting population in the
candidate's jurisdiction.
136. See id.
137. See id. There are challengers who are more popular or wealthier than incumbents, and
this analysis would not apply to them. However, incumbents tend to be wealthier and betterfinanced candidates. See generally supra note 116.
138. S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1792; S. REP. No.
92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1856.
139. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1856.
140. See S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1794.
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dramatically increased the cost of election campaigns. 14' Even if Congress
set an appropriate spending limitation in 1971, the limitation was
improperly designed to keep up with the increasing costs of campaigning
over time. While only circumstantially, the continuous increase in
campaign spending indicates that FECA's spending limitation does not
reflect actual campaign spending needs. 42 If Congress set a spending
limitation that was too low, then the negative impact of FECA's total
spending limitation would be more severe than observed above.
FECA's provision that allowed political candidates to acquire bank
loans benefitted incumbents as well. 143 Congress reasoned that enabling
candidates to incur debt created a more equal playing field between
wealthier candidates and less-financed candidates.'" At the same time,
FECA mandated that all banks secure their loans with sufficient
collateral. 45 Because incumbents are better funded than challengers,' 46 the
two provisions had the practical effect of making it harder for a challenger
to borrow money or to borrow as much money as an incumbent could
borrow. 141
It seems that the 1971 Act offered distinct advantages to incumbent
candidates. It is not clear whether Congress intended this outcome, or
whether the outcome is simply the practical result of the Act. However, it
is clear that FECA benefitted incumbents by establishing various spending
limitations and price controls on advertising with broadcast and nonbroadcast media. As will be explained in the next section, FECA's
characterization as legislation benefiting incumbents makes it possible to
compare the relationship between FECA and incumbents to an unstable oil
cartel and its members.
B. FECA Failedto Reduce CampaignSpending Because Political
Candidateswere Motivated to Circumvent FECA 's
Spending Limitations
In passing the 1971 Act, Members of Congress acted like an oil
cartel.148 Because FECA tended to benefit existing Members of Congress
141. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1856.
142. See generally supra note 116.
143. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1858.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See generally supra note 116.
147. See generally supra note 116.
148. BENJAMIN ZYCHER, OPEC, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). An oil cartel is "a
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by limiting campaign spending, 4 9 Congress's vote to enact FECA was
similar to oil producers forming a cartel to dictate market terms that are
favorable to them. This section will show that oil cartels are unstable and
tend to dissolve when their individual members and oil producers, who are
not cartel members, have the incentive to supply oil above the level
specified by the cartel. Similar to oil producers, political candidates had an
intrinsic incentive to "cheat" or circumvent FECA's spending limitations.
The incentive to avoid FECA's spending limitations could explain why
Congress failed to reduce campaign spending with FECA's enactment.
First, this section will outline a series of analytical principles that are
ftndamental to a public choice theory analysis. These principles are
helpful in understanding the cartel paradigm. Second, an explanation of
why oil cartels fail will be presented. Third, using public choice
methodology, this section will analogize FECA's relationship with
political candidates to the relationship between oil cartels and oil
producers. This step will build on the analytical conclusions from the
previous section-that FECA's pricing scheme and spending limitations
tended to benefit incumbent candidates.
1. Public Choice Theory Principles
This section surveys a series of public choice theory principles that are
essential to a public choice theory analysis. The following examination is
not exhaustive. It merely surveys a few principles that are relevant to this
Article's inquiry. The first principle is "individual rationality,"' 50 which
"posits that whatever divergent preferences an individual might hold, she
is presumed to engage in the cost effective pursuit of her desired
objectives.""' Regardless of a person's desires, inclinations, motivations,

incentives, religious and moral beliefs and values, the person will act
rationally.' 52 However, acting rationally is not the equivalent of acting in
group of [oil] producers that attempts to restrict output in order to keep prices higher than the
competitive level." Id. An incomplete oil cartel is one that does not include all relevant oil
producers to enable the cartel to decrease the overall market supply of oil. See generally Cartel
Definition, supra note 52 (defining a cartel as "a combination of independent commercial or
industrial enterprises designed to limit competition or fix prices" or "a combination of political
groups for common action").
149. This sentence refers to the pricing and spending limitations that tend to favor incumbents.
150. See MAXwELL L. STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (forthcoming West Publishing Co. 2009) (manuscript ch. 1, at 10, on file
with the author).
151. Id. at ll.
152. See id. at 10.
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self-interest.' 53 While self-interested behavior can be rational, not all
rational behavior is self-interested. 154 For example, a person who acts
charitably is not acting in self-interest but is acting rationally.' Also,
rational behavior is not necessarily reasonable behavior. A person can act
rationally based on the information available, and that person's actions are
not necessarily reasonable due to the possibility of faulty or misleading
information, which might have been the basis of the decisionmaking
process. Another aspect of rational behavior is that individuals make their
preferences according to the principle of transitivity.'56 If a person prefers
A to B and B to C, then rationality dictates that the same person prefers A
to C as well.'57
The second principle of public choice theory acknowledges the
importance of institutions in shaping individual behavior.' 58 Institutions are
generally defined as the "humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They are made of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, and
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions,
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.
Together, they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies."' 5' Given this definition, public choice theory reveals that
incentives and constraints, which shape
different institutions offer different
160
how individuals make choices.
Thus, a person is likely to behave differently in different institutions. 6 !
This does not mean that a person's fundamental preferences or motivations
change as his institutional settings change. 162 It merely means that a
person's decisions may change in response to changes in institutional
incentives. 163 Professor Steams and Zywicki capture this intuition when
they say:
An individual member of Congress, for example, who is motivated
to pursue special interest legislation for her district or to further
153. Id. at 11.
154. See id.
155. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150, at 11.

156.
157.
158.
159.

See id.at 3 (manuscript ch. 3).
See id.
See id.at 15 (manuscript ch. 1).
Id. at 16-17 (citing Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM.

ECON. REv. 359, 360 (1994)).

160.
161.
162.
163.

See STEARNS & ZYWiCKi, supra note 150, at 15-18.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 17.
See id. at 18.
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partisan concerns associated with her party is unlikely to abandon
these goals simply because she is called upon to address a set of
questions that are labeled constitutional rather than ordinary,
politics. For example, her motivations are likely to remain when
voting on a prospective judicial nominee, a proposed constitutional
amendment, or a decision whether to impeach the President or some
other Officer."6
'
The third principle of public choice theory is "agency costs."165
"Agency costs" are "[t]he divergence between the goals of the group of
voters or other decision makers and the actions of those they elect or
otherwise choose to represent their interests .
. 166 Political
representatives do not always act in a manner that is congruent with the
interests of those they represent. This incongruity flows from the idea that
political representatives "are not neutral conduits through which principals
further their goals. Instead, the agents themselves possess preferences and
motivations that sometimes coincide with, and other times diverge from,
those of their principals.' ' 167 For example, if voters desire fair elections, it
does not necessarily
mean that a campaign finance statute will further the
168
objective.
voters'
The fourth principle of public choice theory recognizes that institutions
do not act; individual members within institutions act, creating collective
results. 169 The concept of "methodological individualism" captures this
intuition. 7 °"Collective action, is viewed as the action of individuals when
they choose to accomplish purposes collectively rather than individually,
and the government is seen as nothing more than the set of processes, the
machine, which allows such collective action to take place."'' To put it
differently, "Congress is a 'they,' not an 'it."" 72 In examining institutional
behavior, the public choice theory method pays close attention to how

164. Id. at 15-16.
165. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150, at 18.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 18-19.
168. See generally id.
169. See id. at 20-21.
170. As will be revealed later in this Article, cartels fail because of "methodological
individualism."
171. STEARNS & ZYWiCKi, supra note 150, at 20 (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 13 (1962)).
172. Id. at 20 (citing Kenneth Schepsle, Congressis a "They" Not an "It": LegislativeIntent
as an Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)).
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make decisions given specific institutional
individuals within institutions
73
1
incentives.
and
constraints
Finally, the fifth principle of public choice theory uses an "exchange
model" as opposed to a "public interest model" of government174 to
describe political processes. 71 "[L]n contrast with the conventional
understanding of politics as a search for the 'public interest,' the exchange
model captures the intuition that those who demand government provided
goods and services, voters, interest groups and lobbyists, offer their
support to those elected officials who, in exchange, agree to provide
them.' ' 176 Under this model, those who seek government provided goods
and services can be characterized as rent-seekers.' 77
2. Cartels and Why They Fail
A cartel is defined as "a group of producers that attempts to restrict
output in order to keep prices higher than the competitive level.' ' 178 This
section uses the example of oil cartels' 79 to explain why cartels form and
why they fail. 8° Individual oil producers have a strong incentive to
maximize the return on their production of oil.' 8 ' Because this is the
incentive of individual oil producers, when all oil producers are
"considered as a collective, the cartel members have a strong incentive to
reduce aggregate output, with pro-rata allocations among individual
producers, in an effort to set price at the same level that a monopolist
would who controlled the entire market.' 81 2 Acting together, oil producers
cease to be price takers' 83 because the aggregate effect of their individual
reductions in the supply of oil enables them to increase the price of oil and
173. See id. at 20-21.
174. See id. at 3 (manuscript ch. 2). The "public interest model" stands for the idea that
"government intervention [was] necessary to insure that markets produced socially optimal
result[s]." Id. at 4.
175. See id. at 23 (manuscript ch. 1).
176. STEARNs & ZYwIcKI, supra note 150, at 23-24. Rent seeking is described in more detail
in chapter 2. See id. at 6-8 (manuscript ch. 2).
177. See id. (manuscript ch. 2). In this example, the rent is the government provided goods or
services.
178. See supra text accompanying note 148.
179. This example is applicable to all commodity cartels.
180. See also STEARNs & ZYWiCKI, supra note 150 (manuscript ch. 1).
181. Seeid. at20.
182. Id.
183. Individual producers acting alone do not have the power to manipulate the market price
of oil. Thus, they are price takers, meaning that they only can charge the market price for oil.
Charging more would divert buyers to other producers who continue to charge the market price.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

maximize individual profits.'" The motivation to enter a cartel lies in the
oil producers' ability to artificially inflate prices by collectively restricting
the supply of oil in the market." 5
Nevertheless, oil cartels are unstable because their members are
motivated to "cheat."1"6 "The resulting instability arises as a direct
consequence of the divergent motivations of the cartel as a whole, on the
one hand, and its individual members on the other."'8 7 In accordance with
the principles of "individual rationality" '
and "methodological
individualism,"'8 9 a producer's initial preference for individual profit
maximization is not likely to change merely because the producer becomes
a cartel member.' 9° Oil producers remain motivated to maximize their
individual profits, while the cartel's motivation is to maintain a limit on
the supply of oil to keep its market price elevated.' 9 Consequently,
Professors Steams and Zywicki explain:
Each member is motivated to sell just a bit more than the allocated
cartel share at a price just below the level dictated by the cartel.
Each individual member of the cartel hopes to get away with
modest cheating while the remaining cartel members adhere to their
quotas, thus sustaining the overall favorable pricing structure ....
Over time, therefore, the cartel output and pricing scheme tends to
erode, with the effect of moving both the output and price back
toward the pre-cartel, competitive level.' 92
The incentive to cheat also can be explained using a typical prisoner's
dilemma. 93 The prisoner's dilemma is a non-zero sum game used in the
184. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150, at 20-21 (manuscript ch. 1).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 20.
188. This principle captures the intuition that an individual's fundamental preferences and
motivations (in this case to maximize individual profit) are not likely to change merely because the
individual's institutional setting has changed (in this case acting under the cartel as opposed to
individually). See id. at 11.
189. This principle captures the intuition that the mere fact that an individual is a member of
an organization does not mean that the individual loses his or her identity to that organization.
STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 19-20). A cartel can act only through the
individual actions of its members.
190. Id. (manuscript at 19-20).
191. Id. (manuscript at 20-21).
192. Id. (manuscript at 20).
193. Princeton University, Prisoner'sDilemma, http://wwwprinceton.edu/-mdaniels/PD/PD.
html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
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context of a game theory. 94 Because the prisoner's dilemma is a non-zero
sum game, its participants can cooperate. 95 In the context of this game,
cooperation produces the optimal outcome for all of the participants.' 96
The game assumes that the overriding motivation of the individual
participants is to maximize their individual benefit and payoff.'97 With this
assumption in mind, the prisoner's dilemma reveals that, while
cooperation among the participants produces the optimal outcome,
individual participants will prefer non-cooperation to cooperation.'98
For example, assume two prisoners, A and B, are placed in separate
cells, and the police offers them the following deal. If A and B confess,
then both will serve four years in prison. 99 If neither one confesses, then
each will go to prison for two years.200 If one of the prisoners confesses to
the crime while the other remains silent, then the prisoner who confesses
will go free, and the other prisoner will serve a sentence of five years.20 '
Figure 1 illustrates the above conditions.

B defects
B cooperates

A defects

A cooperates

4, 4
0,5

5, 0
2,2

Figure 1: Prisoner's Dilemma
With these conditions in place, the optimal outcome results when both
prisoners cooperate by not confessing to the crime.20 2 If they cooperate,
then they will each receive two years in prison, serving a total of four
years. However, individually, each prisoner realizes that his optimal
outcome results from confessing when the other prisoner remains silent.20 3
If A does not cooperate with B and confesses, then A will go free
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Princeton University, supra note 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Princeton University, supra note 193.
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(assuming that B does not confess).2" For A, not serving any time is a
better outcome than serving two years in prison.2" 5 This realization is
consistent with the above assumption that the overriding motivation of the
individual participants is to maximize their own benefit and payoff.206 Both
prisoners come to the same realization. 2°' Because of this, both A and B
rationally choose to confess, hoping that the other prisoner will remain
silent.2 8 As a result, each prisoner ends up serving a four-year sentence
rather than a two-year sentence that would have resulted if the prisoners
cooperated.2 °9
When this game is played repeatedly, the participants begin to learn
and understand the possible outcomes of their decision making. 20 Both A
and B will try to figure out each other's strategy to minimize their
individual prison sentence. 211 For example, if A believes or anticipates that
B's strategy will be to confess, then A will continue to confess as well.212
If A does not confess and B confesses, then A risks serving a five-year
sentence. 2 " The prisoner's dilemma reveals that, when the game is played
repeatedly with the same participants, the participants will make decisions
in light of what they expect the other participants to do.21 4
The dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma are present in the cartel
context as well. When all cartel members cooperate, they can reduce the
supply of oil, while increasing the market price of oil.215 They can achieve
this result only by cooperating with each other.216 However, an individual
member who decides to cheat (by supplying a bit more and charging a bit
less than the remaining cartel members) will generate higher profits than
those producers who do not cheat. 217 Recall that the incentive to cheat
affects all producers. 2 8 Therefore, all members are likely to cheat, hoping
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Princeton University, supra note 193.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Princeton University, supra note 193.
214. Id.
215. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 19-20).
216. See id. They could all agree to reduce their individual supply of oil to the level specified
by the cartel. Individually, no producer can manipulate the market price of oil unless the producer
can be characterized as a monopolist.
217. Id. (manuscript at 20-21).
218. Id. (manuscript at 20).
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that the remaining producers will continue to supply oil at the level
specified by the cartel.219
The outcome of such aggregate behavior is similar to the situation in
the prisoner's dilemma in which both A and B confess, thus serving a fouryear sentence rather than a two-year sentence.22 ° In the cartel example,
widespread cheating tends to increase the supply of oil, which
subsequently reduces the price of oil to a pre-cartel level. 22' When this
happens, oil producers no longer benefit from a higher price of oil.
Therefore, cheating in the cartel context, similar to defection and noncooperation in the prisoner's dilemma context, leads to a less desirable
outcome for all oil producers than the outcome that would have resulted
from cooperation.222
In a competitive market, an oil cartel that does not include all relevant
oil producers (an incomplete cartel) will fail for reasons similar to those
presented above.223 When most, but not all, oil producers become cartel
members, they can reduce the supply of oil to effectuate an increase in the
overall market price of oil. 224 Because the market price of oil increases,
even producers who are not members of the cartel, namely price takers,225
will benefit from the increased price ofoil. 226 These producers, who are not
bound by the cartel's supply limitations, will seek to produce a bit more
oil and sell at a slightly lower price than the cartel members in order to

219. Id. (manuscript at 20-2 1).
220. See supra text accompanying note 191.
221. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20-21).
222. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 191.
223. This tends to be the case in competitive markets, which are characterized by competition
among price-taking firms. The same is not always the case where a few oil producers control large
market shares. For example, in a market with multiple oil producers, if one or a few producers
control 90% of the market, then their reduction in the supply of oil may be sufficient to effectuate
a price change, regardless of what the other oil producers are doing. See Robert Hessen, Capitalism,
THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC. html (last
visited Aug. 6, 2008).
224. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20).
225. A producer or consumer generally is presumed to be a price taker if his or her
consumption or production does not affect the market price of the good or service being produced.
It is said that all producers are price takers in a perfectly competitive market. See Hessen, supra
note 223 ("Under perfect competition all firms are small scale, products in each industry are
homogeneous, consumers are perfectly informed about what is for sale and at what price, and all
sellers are what economists call price takers.").
226. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20).
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maximize their profits.227 The behavior of the oil producers who are not
228
cartel members will mitigate the cartel's effort to lower the supply of oil.
Because the incentive to cheat affects those who are cartel members and
those who are not,229 the cartel's effort to maintain higher oil prices is
likely to fail in a competitive market.23°
One could speculate that cartels form and dissolve in a cyclical manner.
When the oil cartel fails,23 oil producers end up where they started-a
world in which individual oil producers do not have the market power to
manipulate the price ofoil.232 In this state, oil producers are affected by the
same incentives that promoted the formation of the initial oil cartel, which
was to increase the price of oil above the market price.233 As a result, oil
producers rationally could decide to form a new cartel. A new cartel is
likely to fail as well because of the producers' individual motivation to
cheat. 234 A cyclical formation and dissolution of cartels will continue as
long as the incentives to cheat and maximize individual profits persist.
3. Comparing FECA to Market Cartels Suggests an Explanation for
FECA's Failure to Reduce Campaign Spending
FECA's relationship to political candidates can be compared to the
relationship between the oil cartel and the oil producers. Understanding
why oil cartels fail could explain why Congress failed to reduce campaign
spending when it enacted FECA. In passing FECA, Congress created a
majority coalition235 that is comparable to an oil cartel.236 One may suggest
227. See id. Their actions are indistinguishable from cartel members who decide to cheat by
selling oil at a slightly lower price and producing slightly more oil than the remaining cartel
members. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. See id. (manuscript at 21).
231. A cartel fails when the price of oil returns to, or is close to, the pre-cartel level.
232. This means that they become price takers in a competitive market. However, this may
not be the case in a monopoly or an oligopoly market.
233. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 21).
234. Id. (manuscript at 20-21).
235. This refers to the majority coalition comprised of Members of Congress in support of
FECA. I label members of this coalition as "FECA cartel" members. The remaining Members of
Congress are similar to those oil producers who are not cartel members but who, nevertheless,
benefit from the cartel's efforts to increase the price of oil. This classification may be inaccurate.
It could be the case that the real "FECA cartel" members are the political parties and not the
Members of Congress. However, a detailed exploration of this possibility merits its own article.
236. The comparison does not suggest that Congress was an actual cartel. The comparison is
made with some level of abstraction to provide an analytical framework for understanding why
Congress failed to provide stable and lasting campaign finance reform with FECA.
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that members of this majority coalition, just like the members of the oil
cartel, had an intrinsic and rational incentive to cheat. 237 Also, political
candidates that were not members of the majority coalition had an
incentive to spend above FECA's spending limitations in the same way
that oil producers who are not cartel members are motivated to supply oil
above the cartel's supply quotas. The incentive to circumvent FECA's
spending limitations explains why Congress failed to halt the increasing
costs of federal campaigns.
Congress's decision to enact FECA can be compared to the decision of
individual oil producers to form a cartel. As noted above, oil producers are
motivated to form cartels because of their desire to increase the price of
oil. 238 They can increase the price of oil by acting together to reduce its
market supply.23 9 Otherwise, each individual producer is merely a price
taker.24 0 The increase in the price of oil that results from the creation of the
cartel benefits each cartel member and those oil producers who are not
cartel members.24'
FECA's purpose was to reduce campaign spending in the same way
that the cartel's purpose is to reduce the supply of oil. FECA's pricing and
spending scheme, which was designed to reduce campaign spending
tended to benefit incumbent candidates 24 2 in the same way that the
reduction in the oil supply benefits cartel members. 243 Also, FECA created
advantages for incumbents that were equally available to all Members of
Congress regardless of whether they voted against FECA, 2" similar to how
an increase in the price of oil benefits cartel members and non-cartel
members. Furthermore, Congress could confer campaigning benefits to its
members only after generating a coalition that made it possible to enact

237. Cheating in this section refers to spending in direct violation of FECA's spending
limitations or developing new ways to spend, which are not regulated by FECA but increase the
cost of campaigning beyond what FECA envisioned.
238. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 21).
239. Id. (manuscript at 20).
240. See supra text accompanying note 223.
241. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20).
242. Id. (manuscript at 7-24).
243. The focus here is not on the similarity between the two benefits. The focus is on the
reduction in supply (oil supply or campaign spending) as a means to produce a certain benefit. For
more information on this subject, see the previous section that describes how eliminating section
315 of the Communications Act, the lowest unit rate, the limitation on total spending, and the
collateral requirement tended to benefit incumbents more than challengers.
244. The increase in the price of oil benefits all members of the cartel in the short run even if
they choose to cheat.
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FECA in the same way that individual oil producers can manipulate the
price of oil only by acting together in the form of a cartel.245 No single
Member of Congress has the power to enact legislation, just as no single
oil producer can manipulate the price of oil. 2" FECA consists of various
spending limitations that, like the oil supply quotas, define a "FECA
cartel."'2 47
Because there are sufficient similarities between FECA's relationship
to political candidates and the oil cartel's relationship to oil producers, the
vote to enact FECA may be characterized as a decision to form a "FECA
cartel." The "FECA cartel" members are those Members of Congress who
supported FECA. Members of Congress that did not support FECA, but
who benefited from FECA, are not "FECA cartel" members because they
are similar to those oil producers that benefit from the increase in the oil
price as non-cartel members. Challengers are not "FECA cartel" members
because FECA tended to benefit incumbents more than challengers.
Because some incumbents and all challengers were not "FECA cartel"
members, the "FECA cartel" is similar to an oil cartel that does not have
all relevant oil producers as its members. Also, both the 2"FECA
cartel"
4
and the oil cartel are designed to reduce a specific supply.
Because Congress's vote to enact FECA can be characterized as a vote
to form a cartel, individual political candidates ("FECA cartel" members
and non-members) are motivated to cheat or circumvent FECA's spending
limitations2 49 in the same way that individual oil producers (cartel
members and non-members) are motivated to cheat or circumvent the
cartel's rules (supplying oil beyond the level necessary to maintain a
higher market price for oil).2 ° The incentive to cheat or circumvent
245. An oil cartel can be formed with a majority of oil producers even though some oil
producers do not join the cartel (assuming a competitive market). Similarly, Congress can pass a
bill when it has a sufficient majority supporting the bill's passage. It does not need absolute
consensus among its members for a bill to become law. However, where an oil cartel does not
recruit all relevant oil producers, such oil producers, as independent agents, can contribute to the
demise of the cartel.
246. However, a single oil producer can manipulate the price and fragment oil if the producer
is a monopolist.
247. In this Article, the "FECA cartel" refers to the majority coalition that supported FECA.
Also, with respect to FECA, its limitations were imposed on all candidates, regardless of whether
they supported or stood to benefit from FECA. This is not the case in the oil cartel paradigm. The
members are bound by the supply limitations only.
248. The supply being money in political campaigns and oil in the market.
249. In this Article, cheating by the members of the "FECA cartel" refers to spending by
"FECA cartel" members in direct violation of FECA's provisions and to developing new
unregulated spending methods that tend to increase campaign spending.
250. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20-21).
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FECA's limitations explains why FECA failed to halt the rising cost of
campaigning.
FECA failed to reduce campaign spending because the motivation of
the "FECA cartel" was different than the motivations of the individual
political candidates ("FECA cartel" members and non-members).2 1' The
purpose of the "FECA cartel" was to maintain the statutorily-provided
spending and pricing scheme to limit campaign spending. 2 The
motivations of individual political candidates were probably quite
different. Incumbents were probably more concerned about their
individual political survival than whether FECA would prove to be a stable
and lasting piece of legislation.25 3 The same can be said about those
candidates who were not "FECA cartel" members (challengers and
Members of Congress who did not support FECA). A challenger's initial
motivation to maximize personal payoffs and benefits was not likely to
change merely because "FECA cartel" members voted for the 1971 Act.254
This characterization is consistent with the principles of "individual
' A political candidate
rationality" 255 and "methodological individualism."256
continued to be an individual with unique preferences, although the
candidate became subject to new and different institutional constraints in
the aftermath of FECA's enactment.257
Because the motivation of the individual political candidates was to
maximize individual payoffs, each member could have determined that
spending more money than his or her opponents would increase the
possibility of winning an election, especially if the opponents chose to
abide by FECA's spending limitations.2 58 This determination would have
been contrary to FECA's goal of reducing campaign spending. Recall that
when the motivation of the oil cartel is different than the motivations of its
members, "each individual member of the cartel hopes to get away with
modest cheating while the remaining cartel members adhere to their
quotas, thus sustaining the overall favorable pricing structure.,,259 At the
251. Id. (describing divergent motivations of the oil cartel and its members).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 44-149.
253. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20-2 1) (describing divergent
motivations of the oil cartel and its members).
254. See id. (manuscript at 10) (describing the concept of "individual rationality").
255. See id.
256. See id.(manuscript at 19-21) (describing "methodological individualism").
257. See id. This is akin to the individual oil producer maintaining its unique preferences
despite the cartel members' votes.
258. See STEARNs & ZYwiCKI, supra note 150 (manuscript at 20-21) (describing the
motivation of individual oil producers to supply more than the cartel's quotas).
259. Id. (manuscript at 21).
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same time, oil producers who are not cartel members act similarly to
maximize their profits. By analogy, the divergence between the
motivations of the "FECA cartel" and the motivations of its members
suggests that incumbents were motivated to cheat or circumvent FECA's
spending limitations in order to satisfy their primary motivation of
ensuring individual political survival. At the same time, those who were
not "FECA cartel" members were motivated to cheat for the same reasons
that oil producers who are not cartel members cheat.
Furthermore, there is evidence in FECA's legislative history to suggest
that Congress was aware that candidates might be motivated to circumvent
FECA by spending in direct violation of its provisions or by discovering
new ways to spend that would not be regulated by FECA. Certain
members of the committees considering FECA noted that, while focusing
on certain aspects of the broadcast media and non-broadcast media, FECA
failed to regulate other important campaign spending.26 ° For example,
FECA did not limit expenditures for "mass mailings, for handbills,
brochures, printing, WATS lines, telephones, postage, stationary,
automobiles, trucks, telegrams, campaign headquarters, . . . campaign
workers, airplane rentals and tickets, buses, trains, . . . campaign
newspapers, movie theater film advertisements, campaign staffs, public
relation firms, production expenses for broadcasts, public and opinion
polls, paid campaigners and poll watchers, novelties, bumper stickers,
[and] sample ballots. 26'
Also, Members of Congress were concerned that candidates would
develop new and possibly more expensive ways of campaigning,
effectively defeating FECA's effort to reduce campaigning costs. 2 62 Others
argued that the motivation to circumvent FECA's spending limitations was
intensified by FECA's failure to establish an effective enforcement
apparatus. 263 This argument had special applicability to incumbent
candidates because FECA provided for an enforcement apparatus that was
subject to complete congressional regulation and oversight.26 In essence,
260. S. REP.No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1842-43.
261. Id. at 1843.
262. Id. at 1841-45; S. REP..No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1776,
1805.
263. See also S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1812-17;
S. REP.No. 92-229 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1847. FECA did not establish
an independent agency to enforce and implement its provisions. Id.Instead, it delegated this power.
FECA provided that the Act's enforcement would be delegated to the Comptroller General and the
General Accounting Office. Id. Both of these offices are subject to congressional control,
regulation, and oversight. Id. They are part of the legislative branch of government. Id.
264. See supra text accompanying note 263.
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Congress placed the power to regulate and police the spending of its
members in the hands of its members.
An examination of the "FECA cartel" using the prisoner's dilemma
further reveals why political candidates were motivated to cheat or
circumvent FECA's spending limitations. For the time being, the
examination will focus only on the Members of Congress ("FECA cartel"
members and non-members). Cooperation among the Members of
Congress in the form of adherence to FECA's spending limitations was
necessary to reduce campaign spending and secure FECA's advantages to
incumbents.265 Cooperation, as described here, is similar to the cooperation
between the prisoners in the above dilemma. 266 Recall that the two
prisoners were able to serve the least amount of prison time only when
they cooperated with each other. 267 Nevertheless, like the prisoners'
decision not to cooperate, individual Members of Congress were more
likely to choose not to abide by FECA's limitations because doing so
increased their individual payoffs and benefits. 268 An incumbent would
have had a comparative advantage vis-A-vis his opponents if he could
spend beyond FECA's limitations while his opponents adhered to FECA' s
spending limitations and vice versa. 269 Because this alternative seemed to
produce the highest individual payoff, incumbents were motivated to
defect from FECA's spending limitations in the same way that the
prisoners rationally chose not to cooperate with each other.27°
Recall that, in an effort to secure an optimal individual outcome, the
prisoners' choice not to cooperate with each other result in a greater prison
sentence for both prisoners.27 ' Similarly, in an effort to secure the optimal
individual payoff by circumventing FECA's spending limitations,
Members of Congress achieved an inferior outcome.272 The aggregate of
individual evasion of FECA's spending limitations eroded FECA's
effectiveness, thus increasing the average cost of campaigning for all
candidates.273

265. As noted earlier, no single Member of Congress can enact legislation. See supra text
accompanying notes 245-46.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 193-202.
267. Supra text accompanying notes 193-202.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 251-56.
273. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supranote 150 (manuscript at 20-2 1) (explaining why cartels
fail).
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The above analysis seems to apply even when the challengers are
thrown into the mix. An individual challenger could have rationally
decided that spending beyond FECA's limitations would have increased
his individual payoffs and benefits. A challenger would have had a
comparative advantage vis-A-vis his opponents if he spent more than they
were allowed.274 This explains why challengers were motivated to
circumvent FECA's limitations as well. Nevertheless, the prisoner's
dilemma does not work so well when its participants are incumbents and
challengers. Cooperation between incumbents and challengers produces
an optimal outcome for the incumbents, but not for the challengers. Recall
that, when all candidates adhere to FECA's spending limitations, FECA
tends to favor incumbents over challengers.
Furthermore, based on the prisoner's dilemma, political candidates
were likely to cheat or circumvent FECA's provisions if they anticipated
other candidates would do the same." 5 Recall that where the prisoners'
dilemma is played repeatedly, the behavior of a prisoner depends on what
he anticipates the other prisoner will do.276 If one prisoner thinks that the
other will confess, then he will confess as well.2 77 Also, he will remain
motivated to confess even if he knows that the other prisoner will remain
silent.
Given the information available to all political candidates, political
candidates probably anticipated that their opponents would cheat.
Candidates were probably aware that FECA had absolutely no limitation
on the amount of money that any given candidate could raise for an
election campaign. 271 it merely enacted spending limitations. 279 A
candidate rationally could have concluded that an opponent who
fundraised beyond what that opponent could spend under FECA was
motivated to spend the monetary surplus because he had the money and
knew that there was a positive correlation between spending on an election
campaign and the probability of winning the election. 28 0 At the same time,
candidates knew that FECA did not regulate all campaign spending. 28'
274. See Princeton University, supra note 193.
275. Id.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
278. 1971 FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
279. Id.
280. See John R. Lot, Jr., A Simple Explanationfor Why Campaign Expenditures are
Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger,43 J.L. & ECON. 359 (2000) (noting that campaign
spending increases as the size of the federal government increases).
281. 1972 S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1776, 1804-05
(expressing the view that FECA does not regulate all relevant spending).
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They could have anticipated that some candidates may focus their
spending on advertising, which was not governed by spending
limitations.282 Finally, a candidate simply could have examined the
candidates' spending data to learn that in each new election, candidates
spend more on an upcoming election than what was spent on previous
elections.283
The above reasons are not exhaustive or conclusive, but they suggest
that an incumbent could rationally have anticipated other candidates to
spend beyond what FECA envisioned. 284 As the costs of federal election
campaigns increase, it is difficult, if not impossible, for challengers to
secure the advantages that FECA's spending limitations make available to
incumbents. More importantly, for this Article, FECA's objective to
reduce campaign spending continues to fail because the aggregate increase
in candidate spending erodes FECA's ability to halt the rise in campaign
spending.

IV. CONCLUSION

When Congress enacted FECA, it created a cartel to reduce campaign
spending. Unfortunately, this objective probably contradicted the
motivations of political candidates. As a result of this contradiction, the
dynamics between FECA and the political candidates resembles the
dynamics between an oil cartel and the oil producers (cartel members and
non-members). The similarity suggests that FECA will continue to fail in
reducing campaign spending because political candidates are motivated to
spend above FECA's spending limitations in the same way that oil
producers are motivated to supply oil above the cartel's supply limitations.
The aggregate of such behavior will continue to result in higher
campaigning costs, eroding FECA's ability to accomplish its objective.
The observation to be derived from FECA's comparison to an
incomplete oil cartel is that, as long as the motivations of political
candidates are not aligned with the objectives of campaign finance
legislation, efforts to provide effective campaign finance legislation will
fail. Where a divergence between the motivations of political candidates
and the purpose of campaign finance legislation exists, the dynamics
among the political candidates resembles the dynamics among oil
282. Id.; Lott, supra note 280, at 359 (noting that spending limitations will not reduce
campaign spending and will encourage new spending).
283. See supra note 116.
284. See supra note 116.
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producers in a market with an oil cartel. Perhaps the simple truth that
FECA was amended on four different occasions suggests the validity of
this conclusion.

